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The Move Toward a Negligence Standard in Strict
Products Liability Failure to Warn Cases
I.

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of strict products liability evolved in this country
according to changing societal concerns regarding the relationship
between manufacturers or sellers of products and individual consumers.' This concept manifested the abandonment of traditional
notions that absolved suppliers of chattels of any liability to third
persons in the absence of negligence or privity of contract. 2 Inspiration for this change in legal philosophy stemmed from the rationale that the risk of loss for injury resulting from defective
products should be shouldered by those who market the products,
principally because they are in the best position to absorb the loss
1. In an effort to alleviate the plaintiff's burden of proving the negligence of the supplier in manufacturing and marketing its product, the drafters of the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS adopted the rule of strict liability under § 402A. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. See id. comment c at 349-50 (by marketing product manufacturer assumes special responsibility to
stand behind product).
2. See id. at comments b and 1. This transformation mirrored a shift from nineteenth
century social attitudes which favored protection of the manufacturing industry to the
twentieth century notion that it was the consumer who should be protected. See Azzarello v.
Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 553, 391 A.2d 1020, 1023-24 (1978). The early decision of
Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Excl. Ch. 1842), required privity of contract as
a condition precedent to liability based on negligence. The privity requirement was subsequently altered in Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852), to allow recovery for injury
caused by products that were considered eminently dangerous to human life. In the
landmark decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916),
the manufacturer's duty was extended to all persons injured by products which by their
nature are reasonably certain to result in danger when negligently made. In Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), the Supreme Court of California rejected the doctrines of negligence, privity and warranty, and
endorsed a theory of strict liability for defective products.
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by distributing it as a production cost against which liability insurance can be obtained.3

Section 402A of the

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS4

was

adopted and made a part of the substantive law of Pennsylvania
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Webb v. Zern.5 Following
formal adoption in Webb, Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly embraced the theory of strict products liability as imposing liability
upon suppliers of defective products for injuries caused without
proof of negligence.8 To justify placing such liability upon a supplier, however, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the product was defective; (2) that the defect arose while the product was still in the
7
hands of the defendant; and (3) that the defect caused the injury.
Thus, the pivotal question in most strict products liability cases is
whether a product is defective.' Defects may be categorized as either manufacturing defects, design defects, or defects resulting
from the failure to warn of the inherent dangers of a product.' In a
manufacturing defect case, it is relatively simple to ascertain
whether the product is defective simply by comparing the product
3. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 402A comment c. Shifting the loss from consumers to suppliers serves the dual purpose of encouraging product manufacturers to market safer products while spreading the loss sustained by individual consumers among the
members of the public at large. See Foley v. Clark Equip. Co., 361 Pa. Super. 599, 614-15,
523 A.2d 379, 387 (1987). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at
1120 (4th ed. 1971) (manufacturer liable because it is in the best position to insure against
liability and add to cost of the product) [hereinafter PROSSER].
4. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1.
5. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
6. It has been argued that in order to assure the benefits of strict liability as an effective weapon in the consumer's battle against suppliers of defective products, the law had to
be purged of negligence concepts. See Foley v. Clark Equip. Co., 361 Pa. Super. 599, 615,
523 A.2d 379, 387 (1987).
7. See Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 545 A.2d 906, 909 (1988).
8. In determining whether a product is defective in a strict liability action, the focus is
on the condition of the product rather than the conduct of the manufacturer. See Keeton,
Products Liability-DesignHazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 293, 315
n.87 (1979) (negligence evaluates reasonableness of conduct of manufacturer whereas strict
liability focuses on condition of product); Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product
Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 425, 429 (1974) (negligence linked to reasonableness of conduct of manufacturer whereas strict liability evalutes
condition of product); Comment, Is There a Distinction Between Strict Liability and Negligence in Failure to Warn Actions?, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 983, 984-85 (1981)(negligence
theory places burden of proof on plaintiff to prove manufacturer's conduct).
9. See generally Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REV. 579, 585-88 (1980) (discussing the relationship
among the three types of defects) [hereinafter Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products
Liability Law]; Philips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAKE
L. REV. 317, 342-52 (1978) (describing three types of defects).
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that caused the injury with other products that were manufactured
according to specifications. 10 In a defective design case, however,
the question is whether a safer design was possible in the initial
conceiving, sketching or planning stage of the product." Finally,
when dealing with a defect arising from the failure to warn, 2 the
issue is whether the manufacturer provided consumers with adequate warnings of the dangers of the product and instructions as to
the proper use of the product."
Although defects arising from faulty manufacture or design and
defects arising out of inadequate warnings are covered under the
same rule," the standards are conceptually different. A production
or design defect is something over which a manufacturer has control, while the danger for which a warning is required is not in the
manufacture, but in the use of the product.1 5 Thus, in failure to
warn cases it is the lack of adequate warnings or instructions as to
the dangers of a product, rather than the components of the product itself, that renders a product defective and unreasonably
dangerous.'

6

Theoretically, strict liability under section 402A purports to
completely eradicate the plaintiff's burden of proving negligence
10. See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 659. Manufacturing defect cases frequently arise in
food and beverages. For example, in Slonsky v. Phoenix Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 18 Ariz.
App. 10, 11, 499 P.2d 741, 742 (1972), a plaintiff who sustained injuries from drinking a
bottle of cola containing metal fragments was permitted to recover against the company
upon a showing that the metal fragments entered the cola or the bottle at some point during
the manufacturing process. Id. at 13, 499 P.2d at 744.
11. See PRossER, supra note 3, at 65. Design defects frequently occur in automobiles,
even though automobile manufacturers have an affirmative duty to design crashworthy vehicles. See generally Golden, Automobile Crashworthiness- The Judiciary Responds When
Manufacturers Improperly Design Their Cars, 46 INs. COUNSEL J. 335, 336 n.8, 340-48
(1979) (discussing majority and minority views regarding the design defects in automobiles).
12. Either the inadequacy of a warning or the complete lack of a warning may render a
product defective. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969)
(inadequate or total lack of warning breaches manufacturer's duty to warn); Hamilton v.
Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 382 n.3, 549 P.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (1976) (manufacturer liable for
either complete lack of warning or inadequate warning).
13. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 402A comment j, at 353 (seller may be required to give directions or warnings to prevent product from being unreasonably
dangerous).
14. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 402A.
15. For example, some products contain latent dangers such as flammability, volatility
and explosiveness. See Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L.
REV. 398, 404 (1970).
16. See Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 287, 282 A.2d 206, 219 (1971). A product, as
to which adequate warning of danger involved in its use is required, sold without such warning is in a defective condition. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 402A comment h.
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on the part of the manufacturer.1" However, a plaintiff in a failure
to warn action may find hidden in comment ji1 the imposition of
proving that the manufacturer knew, or by exercising reasonable
foresight, should have known of the risks or hazards about which it
failed to warn. 9 Thus, notwithstanding the traditional notion that
strict liability focuses upon the condition of the product rather
than the conduct of the manufacturer, 0 some courts have held
that a claimant who seeks recovery on the basis of failure to warn
must prove that the manufacturer was negligent.2" It is the infusion of such negligence concepts into the field of strict products
liability which has created the current state of confusion and controversy among the courts.
A growing number of jurisdictions have held that the liability
arising from failure to warn is not strict in the same sense as liability arising from defective manufacturing. 22 Other courts have ap17.

The elements of an action for negligent failure to warn are presently articulated in
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, at 300-01 (1965). Section 388 requires a plaintiff to
establish that the manufacturer knew or had reason to know that the product contained
inherent or latent dangers. Id. at 301. Under § 388, a manufacturer has a duty to exercise
reasonable care to obtain and to provide information detailing the dangers of the product.
Id. at 304, comment g.
18. Comment j of § 402A sets forth the strict liability for failure to warn doctrine. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A comment j, at 353. Although comment j specifically
refers to directions and warnings relative to the dangers of ingredients in food and drugs,
this duty also extends to other types of products, including equipment and household goods.
See PROD. LiAB. REP. (CCH) § 4095 (1979). The duty to warn in strict liability also emanates
from other comments of § 402A. Comment g, for instance, recognizes that certain precautions may be necessary to make a product safe. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A
comment g, at 351. Comment h states that if a manufacturer had "reason to anticipate" that
its product may be hazardous for a certain use, then the manufacturer may have a duty to
warn. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A comment h, at 351-52.
19. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A comment j, at 353 (seller liable for failure
to warn only if he knew or through exercise of reasonable human skill and foresight had
reason to know of the dangers of the product).
20. See supra note 8.
21. As Dean Keeton wrote:
Notwithstanding what some courts have said, in establishing this ground of recovery,
the plaintiff in most states must prove negligence in the failure to warn properly.
There will be no liability in these cases without a showing that the defendant knew or
should have known of the risk or hazard about which he failed to warn. Moreoever,
there will be no liability unless the seller or manufacturer failed to take the precautions that a reasonable person would take in presenting the product to the public.
Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law, supra note 9, at 586-87, quoted
in Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa. Super. 22, 74, 485 A.2d 408, 435 (1984), appeal dismissed,
508 Pa. 643, 500 A.2d 428 (1985). See generally Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d
1390 (8th Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Tinnerholm
v. Parke-Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 411 F.2d 48 (1969).
22. See Woodill v. Parke-Davis & Co., 79 111.2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980) (knowledge
RESTATEMENT
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plied a rule of reasonableness with respect to the duty to warn.2 8
Still other courts, either by judicial decision or legislative enactment, have made comparative negligence principles applicable to
strict products liability.2"
Although Pennsylvania courts have uniformly upheld the notion
of strict liability as being devoid of negligence principles,2 5 recent
decisions involving failure to warn cases suggest the beginning of
"cracks" in the solidified approach against the intermingling of
these concepts. 26 These decisions support the possibility that the
Pennsylvania courts are now ready to recognize the interplay between strict liability and negligence principles in failure to warn
cases.
This comment will analyze the doctrine of strict liability in the
context of the apparent conflict which has emerged from the application of negligence concepts in strict products liability cases involving determinations of whether adequate warnings or the complete lack of warnings render a product defective. The recent trend
in Pennsylvania case law, which appears to suggest that a change
requirement enunciated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS comment j dictates that plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the dangerous propensities of its product); see also Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co, 545 A.2d 906, 912 (1988); In
re Air Crash Disaster at Washington D.C., 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983) (the issue of
failure to warn is governed by a negligence standard); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158 (8th Cir. 1975) (under Minnesota law duty to warn in strict liability
action is based upon actual or constructive knowledge of manufacturer); Basko v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969) (RESTATEMENT adopts the ordinary negligence
concept of duty to warn).
23. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 368 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (whether a product is defective because of inadequate warnings depends on the negligence standards of foreseeability, seriousness and cost of preventing); accord Shell Oil Co. v.
Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 434, 581 P.2d 271, 279 (1978).
24. The highest courts of seventeen states and one territory have taken the initiative
to apply comparative negligence principles to strict products liability. Likewise, nine state
legislatures have enacted statutes extending comparative negligence principles to strict
products liability. See Staymates v. ITT Holub Indus., 364 Pa. Super. 37, 47 n.5, 527 A.2d
140, 145 n.5 (1987). See generally Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.
1984); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982); Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); see also
Bowling v. Jake Sweeney Chevrolet, Inc., No. 84-05-054 (Ohio App., March 31, 1986);
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Sun Valley Airlines,
Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d
443, 155 N.W.2d 55.
25. See Staymates, 364 Pa. Super. at 43, 527 A.2d at 143. See also Azzarello v. Black
Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
26. See Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa. Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408 (1984), appeal dismissed, 508 Pa. 643, 500 A.2d 428 (1985); Mackey v. Maremont Corp., 350 Pa. Super. 415,
504 A.2d 908 (1986); Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 545 A.2d 906, 909 (1988).
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may be imminent, will be specifically examined. Finally, this comment will suggest that the Pennsylvania courts may now be amenable to joining the growing consensus of American jurisdictions allowing the introduction of negligence concepts into strict products
liability failure to warn cases.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENTS OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW IN

FAILURE TO WARN CASES

The intermingling of negligence concepts within an area labeled
"strict liability" has been a source of confusion and accounts for
much disarray in the opinions of Pennsylvania's courts. In the
past, Pennsylvania courts have been emphatic in divorcing principles of negligence from strict products liability cases. 27 The warning signals against separation of the two tort concepts have come
in many forms.2 5

In one of the first modern Pennsylvania cases which wrestled
with the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined in
29
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corporation
that if a product is
defective in the absence of adequate warnings, and the defect is
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, the supplier is strictly
liable without proof of negligence. 30 Examining section 402A, Chief

Justice Jones, joined by Justice Nix, stated that a manufacturer is
responsible for injury caused by its defective product even if the
27. See, e.g., Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975);
Staymates v. ITT Holub Indust., 364 Pa. Super. 37, 527 A.2d 140 (1987); Azzarello v. Black
Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
28. See Baker v. Outboard Marine Corp., 595 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law) (jury instructions regarding negligence should be kept out of § 402A cases);
Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 569 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1977) (applying Pennsylvania law) (Pennsylvania courts do not permit the introduction of comparative negligence principles into a §
402A case); Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Horton Co., 515 Pa. 334, 528 A.2d 590 (1987)
(section 402A expressly implies that the exercise of all possible care by a manufacturer does
not affect the imposition of strict liability for a product defect). See also Sherk v. DaisyHeddon, 498 Pa. 594, 605, 450 A.2d 615, 621 (1982) ("The liability imposed on manufacturers of defective products is denominated strict, or without fault .
")(Hutchinson, J.,
concurring).
29. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). Plaintiff's decedent was killed in a helicopter
crash. Plaintiff brought wrongful death and survival actions, including a claim in strict liability, against the manufacturer of the helicopter. Id. at 91-92, 337 A.2d at 897-98. The court
stated that it was reversible error where the FAA had promulgated standards as to warnings
required of a manufacturer, and violation of these standards itself was considered a defective condition. Id. at 103, 337 A.2d at 903.
30. Id. The Berkebile court did not address the issue of whether warnings were required, but dealt primarily with the question of whether the required warnings were adequate. Id. at 103, 337 A.2d at 903. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at § 402A comment
h.
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manufacturer has exercised all possible care in the manufacturing
and marketing of his product." The chief justice opined that the
inclusion of the term "unreasonably dangerous" in section 402A
was not intended to import negligence principles into a strict liability case, but rather, was intended to prevent a manufacturer
from being held liable as an insurer instead of as a guarantor of a
product's safety."2
Although the precedential authority of Berkebile was for a time
uncertain,3 3 the uncertainty was eliminated by the supreme court's
34
subsequent decision in Azzarello v. Black Brothers Company.
There, the supreme court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Nix,
approved and adopted the decision in Berkebile.3 5 In doing so, the
court went one step further than it had in Berkebile in holding
that the purpose of the term "unreasonably dangerous" in section
402A is to impose on the trial court the responsibility of deciding,
as a matter of law, whether strict liability should be placed upon a
supplier.3" Reiterating that the supplier's liability is that of a guarantor, not an insurer, 3 the court set forth a model jury instruction
31.
TORTS

Berkebile, 462 Pa. at 91, 337 A.2d at 899 (quoting RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

§ 402A(2)(a) (1965)).

32. Id. at 93, 337 A.2d at 894.
33. Berkebile was a plurality opinion written by then Chief Justice Jones, joined by
Justice (now Chief Justice) Nix. Id. at 83, 337 A.2d at 893.
34. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978). Plaintiff, who was injured when his hand was
pinched between two hard rubber rolls in a coating machine manufactured by the defendant, relied solely on the theory of strict liability under the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 402A. In giving the jury instructions, the trial court repeatedly used the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" taken verbatim from § 402A. Id. at 550, 391 A.2d at 1022. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" should not be
used in framing the issues for the jury, but instead is a term of art which should only be
considered by the court in making an initial determination as to whether strict liability is
appropriate. Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
35. Id. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027.
36. Id. at 556-57, 391 A.2d at 1025-26. The supreme court stated that:
[Tihe phrases 'defective condition' and 'unreasonably dangerous' as used in the Restatement formulation are terms of art invoked [to determine] when strict liability is
appropriate. It is a judicial function to decide whether, under plaintiff's averment of
the facts, recovery would be justified; and only after this judicial determination is
made is the cause submitted to the jury to determine whether the facts of the case
support the averments of the complaint.
Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026 (emphasis in original).
37. Id. at 553, 391 A.2d at 1024. The difference in regarding the manufacturer as an
insurer versus a guarantor of a product was explained by Dean Wade as follows:
What do we mean when we speak of strict liability of a manufacturer for harm caused
by his product? Is it sufficient for a plaintiff to show that he used the defendant's
product and that he was injured? The answer to this is no. If the plaintiff's theory is
breach of warranty, he must prove the breach-i.e., that the article was not merchantable or was not fit for the purpose sold. If the theory is strict liability in tort,
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devoid of negligence concepts.38 It is noteworthy, however, that although the defect alleged in Azzarello was one of design and not
failure to warn, 9 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did recognize
that the test of reasonableness might be appropriate in the initial
determination of whether warnings were required. 0
Perhaps the most stringent stand against the intermingling of
negligence concepts in strict products liability failure to warn cases
came in the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision of Dambacher v.
Mallis. 1 Relying upon the supreme court's analysis in Azzarelo, 2
the court reaffirmed the distinction between strict products liability and negligence standards of proof.'3 To buttress its position,
the court delineated the theoretical differences between traditional
strict liability cases,"' products liability cases,'" and ordinary negligence cases.' 6 Based on these distinctions, the court reasoned that
a jury in a strict products liability case should be instructed that it
the plaintiff must still prove that the article was unsafe in some way. Thus, the liability is not that of an insurer; it is not absolute in the literal sense of that word.
Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.J. 13 (1965), quoted in Azzarello v.
Black Brothers Co., 480 Pa. 547, 554 n.5, 391 A.2d 1020, 1024 n.5 (1978). See also Ellis v.
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 545 A.2d 906, 909 (1988).
38. The Azzarello court determined that a jury should be instructed that they may
find a defect where "the product left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to
make it safe for its intended use." 480 Pa. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027.
39. Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
40. Id. The court indicated that the term "unreasonably dangerous" serves a useful
purpose in the initial determination of predicting when strict liability is an appropriate
question for the jury to consider. This initial determination is a judicial function based upon
social policy and risk utility analysis. Id.
41. 336 Pa. Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408 (1984), appeal dismissed, 508 Pa. 643, 500 A.2d
428 (1985). In Dambacher,an automobile passenger, who was rendered a quadriplegic in an
accident allegedly caused by the driver's action of mixing radial and nonradial tires on the
subject automobile, brought a strict liability action against the defendant manufacturer of
the tires. The plaintiff alleged that, although the manufacturer had issued instructions concerning the proper use of its steel-belted radial tires, it had still marketed a defective product because it failed to imprint on the wall of the tire a warning against using steel-belted
radial tires in conjunction with non-radial tires. Id. at 28, 485 A.2d at 411.
42. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978). See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
43. Dambacher, 336 Pa. Super. at 52, 485 A.2d at 424.
44. Id. at 52-53, 485 A.2d at 424. The court defined traditional strict liability cases as
encompassing situations where the defendant has engaged in an ultrahazardous activity that
cannot be made safe. In such cases, the defendant may be held strictly liable as an insurer
for injuries caused by the dangerous activity. Id.
45. Id. The court emphasized that in product liability cases, the manufacturer is not
regarded as an insurer, but rather as a guarantor of its product's safety. Therefore, a plaintiff cannot recover absent proof of a defect in the product. Id.
46. Id. In a negligence case, the defendant is liable neither as an insurer nor guarantor.
Accordingly, a plaintiff must prove that the manufacturer failed to exercise due care in the
manufacturing or supplying of its product. Id.
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is only to consider whether the product was safe in the absence of
warnings or in light of the warnings given, and not to determine
whether the warning given by the manufacturer was reasonable."7
Judge Wieand, who both concurred and dissented in
Dambacher,'5 vehemently disagreed with the majority's proposition that the reasonable man standard for determining negligence
has no place under section 402A for the failure to warn.' " Instead,
he suggested that in strict products liability cases based upon failure to warn, the duty to warn should be assessed against the negligence concepts of foreseeability and reasonableness." In support of
his position, Judge Wieand listed nine cases from nine different
jurisdictions which have held that the issue of failure to warn
should be governed by a negligence standard. 1
One of the most complete discussions of strict liability failure to
warn actions is found in the 1987 Pennsylvania Superior Court de2 Although
cision of Staymates v. ITT Holub Industries.5
the court
47. Id. at 57, 485 A.2d at 426.
48. Judge Wieand concurred with the majority's opinion that the judgment should be
vacated and the case remanded for a new trial, but dissented from the majority's analysis
regarding the proper jury instructions in strict liability failure to warn cases. Id. at 89-90,
485 A.2d at 443.
49. Id. at 74-75, 485 A.2d at 435-36. Judge Wieand stated that: "Perhaps as a matter
of academic purity, an attempt to eliminate standards of reasonableness from strict liability
in products liability cases can be applauded. In actual practice, however, such an approach
is not feasible in failure to warn cases." Id. at 75, 485 A.2d at 436 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 77-78, 485 A.2d at 437. Judge Wieand suggested that the majority's standard-that a product is defective if a supplier has failed to give warnings adequate to make
its product safe-imposes upon suppliers an absolute duty to insure a product's safety by
warning users of any injury which may result from use of the product. Id. at 76, 485 A.2d at
436. Under the majority's standard, for example, a manufacturer of knives will be considered to have manufactured a defective product if it fails to warn that a knife may cut. Id.
Similarly, an automobile manufacturer who fails to warn of the inherent dangers of operating an automobile at excessive speed will be considered to have manufactured a defective
product. Id. Judge Wieand also opined that the majority's standard is simply unworkable
with respect to risks or hazards about which the manufacturer was unaware until after the
product was manufactured. Id. at 76-77, 485 A.2d at 437.
51. Id. at 75, 485 A.2d at 436 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., 559
F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983); Young v. Up-Right Scaffolds, Inc., 637 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Hall v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Russell v. G.A.F. Corp., 422 A.2d 989
(D.C. App. 1980); Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d 271 (1978); Jonescue v.
Jewel Home Shopping Serv., 16 Ill. App. 3d 339, 306 N.E.2d 312 (1974); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 661 P.2d 348 (1983); Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 72 A.D.2d 59, 423
N.Y.S.2d 95 (1979), afl'd mem., 52 N.Y.2d 768, 436 N.Y.S.2d 614, 417 N.E.2d 1002 (1980)).
52. 364 Pa. Super. 37, 527 A.2d 140 (1987). Plaintiff was injured when he accidently
put his hand into a dust collecting machine that had malfunctioned. Id. at 40, 527 A.2d at
141. It was alleged that the product's defective condition was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Id. at 41, 527 A.2d at 142. Following a jury award in favor of the plaintiff, the
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continued to uphold the separation of negligence and strict liability principles,5" the first signs of recognition of countervailing considerations appeared. Throughout its opinion, the Staymates court
acknowledged the emerging consensus in courts of other jurisdictions on the use of comparative negligence principles in strict
products liability suits." In what appears to be an inordinate attempt to justify the court's refusal to join this growing consensus, a
complete synopsis of the historical development of strict products
liability law in Pennsylvania was presented. 5 Recognizing that it
was not within its province to change the strict liability principles
adopted and announced by the supreme court, the Staymates
court declined to imitate its sister states in taking the initiative to
apply comparative negligence principles to a strict products liability case.56 Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Superior Court suggested
that any modification of section 402A should appropriately come
from either the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the legislature."
Interestingly, the Staymates court's pronouncement on the issue
of complete separation of negligence and strict products liability
concepts was followed by a detailed analysis of a manufacturer's
liability for failure to warn.5 8 Emphasizing that failure to warn can
be defeated by the absence of either unreasonable danger or proximate cause,5 9 the court stated that before the issue of causation
may be submitted to a jury, the evidence must support a reasonable inference, rather than a guess, that the damages may have been
defendants appealed on the basis that the trial court had erred in refusing to submit the
issue of plaintiff's comparative negligence to the jury. The case was one of first impression.
Id. at 42, 527 A.2d at 142.
53. Id. at 43, 527 A.2d at 143.
54. The Staymates court acknowledged that it was "quite aware that a number of
states have taken the initiative, be it by judicial decision or legislative enactment, to apply
comparative negligence principles to strict products liability." Id. at 46-47, 527 A.2d at 145.
55. Id. at 42-47, 527 A.2d at 142-45.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 47, 527 A.2d at 145. The court stated that it was not within its province to
alter the existing law regarding the use of comparative negligence principles in strict liability suits. Accordingly, the court stated that:
[Ifn the absence of any indication from our Supreme Court that it is willing to alter
its stance . . . favoring a retention of the dichotomy between strict liability and comparative negligence in the area of products liability, we find it inauspicious at this
time to follow suit with some of our sister states who have opted to mold strict liability principles with notions of comparative negligence.
Id.
58. Id. at 51-54, 527 A.2d at 147-48.
59. Liability for failure to warn arises when the absence of a warning is both "unreasonably dangerous and the proximate cause of the accident." Id. at 51, 527 A.2d at 147
(quoting Greiner v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselleschaft, 540 F.2d 85, 96 (3d Cir. 1976)).
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prevented if an adequate warning had been given." In sum, although the court denied the defendant's requested relief on the
grounds that negligence and strict liability concepts cannot be
mixed,6 1 the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was ultimately
re62
versed by treating failure to warn as a separate issue.
III.

THE PRESENT STATE OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY FAILURE
TO WARN CASES IN PENNSYLVANIA

After several years of confusion, the July 1, 1988, superior court
decision in Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Company's began to
provide some insight and structure to the Pennsylvania courts'
analysis of strict products liability in failure to warn cases."" For
the first time, a Pennsylvania court clearly and unequivocally acknowledged that the resolution of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous without adequate warnings, and thus defective for
purposes of strict liability, necessarily involves examination of negligence principles such as reasonableness and foreseeability6 5 Jus60. Id. at 51, 527 A.2d at 147. See also Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195, 198 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985); Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 498 Pa. 594, 450 A.2d
615 (1982). In Sherk, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict in favor of a
manufacturer of a BB gun which caused injury. Although the court's analysis focused on
whether the absence of warnings was the "proximate cause" of the injury, and not whether a
warning was necessary, the court concluded that the trial court had erred in excluding evidence of whether the danger or possibility of danger of the gun was generally known and
appreciated in the community of which plaintiff was a member. Id. at 597 n.2, 450 A.2d at
617 n.2.
61. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
62. Staymates, 364 Pa. Super. at 53-54, 527 A.2d at 148. The court reversed and remanded on the grounds that they could not ascertain whether the jury's finding of a "defect" was based on the design of the machine or the lack of an adequate warning. Id. Moreover, the court stated that the failure to warn would not be a proper basis for the award
since there was no evidence that a different or additional warning would have altered the
result. Id.
63. 545 A.2d 906 (1988). This case involved a shipment of steel plates, fabricated at
Chicago Bridge & Iron Company's plant in Greenville, Pennsylvania. The plates were to be
sent to the United States Arab Emirates by barge via Philadelphia. Chicago Bridge provided
no instructions concerning the handling of the plates in transit. Id. at 907. When a longshoreman was killed while handling the plates, a suit was brought under the theory of strict
liability. Id. at 908. The contention was that Chicago Bridge & Iron Company had failed to
provide appropriate instructions. Id.
64. The issue addressed by the court was whether the trial court erred in allowing the
question of strict liability to be taken to the jury based upon the plaintiff's allegations that a
product, not alleged to be defective for use in its intended purpose, became defective as to
intermediate shippers by the manufacturer's failure to provide instructions or warnings. Id.
at 910.
65. Id. at 912-13. Specifically, the Chicago Bridge court stated that:
As further indication that the rule of reasonableness applies with respect to inade-
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tification for this exception in failure to warn cases was based on
the court's belief that the liability deriving from inadequate warnings is not "strict" in the same sense as liability arising from manufacturing design defects. 6
In Chicago Bridge, the superior court pointed out that almost
every industrial product is capable of inflicting injury 7 and that
warnings cannot be reasonably required in the marketing of every
product6 8 Therefore, in the absence of a rule as to the circumstances under which a warning is required, the court reasoned that
every product would be considered defective, 69 and every manufac70
turer would be an insurer rather than a guarantor of its product.
To avoid this harsh result, the court recommended that a rule of
reasonableness as to standards of conduct be applied to ascertain
7 1
the circumstances under which a warning is required.
Thus, the Chicago Bridge decision definitively establishes that
the infusion of negligence principles into strict products liability
actions is indeed appropriate in failure to warn cases.7 2 Moreover,
the court's reliance upon negligence concepts in making its initial
determination of whether a strict liability action should be submitted to a jury upholds the separation of negligence and strict liability concepts while allowing "reasonableness," as well as other factors, to negate the manufacturer's duty to warn.73 Consequently,
quate warning cases, it has been held that liability attaches only if the supplier knew,
or by the use of its special skill and knowledge should have known, of the danger, or
where the dangerous use to which the product might be put was reasonably foreseeable ...
Id. at 913.
66. Id. at 912.
67. Id. at 909.
68. Id. For example, the court stated that "a product is not defective without warnings
where the danger is obvious or where the injured person, his employer, or an expert or
technically trained person under whom he was working, knew of the danger." Id. at 913.
69. Id. at 909.
70. Id. See supra note 37.
71. 545 A.2d at 909, 913. The Chicago Bridge court's espoused standard of reasonableness is consistent with the Azzarello court's earlier recognition that the test of reasonableness might be appropriate in the initial determination of whether warnings were required.
See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
72. Negligence principles are considered, however, only at the pleading stage where a
judicial determination is made as to whether the case is appropriate for treatment under
strict products liability. Chicago Bridge, 545 A.2d at 912-913. In Chicago Bridge, the court
determined that the case was improperly tried under strict liability because the failure to
warn did not constitute a "defect" since the danger or potential of danger was readily recognizable to the user. Id. at 914.
73. Id. at 913. The court emphasized that a supplier is liable only if it knew or should
have known of the product's danger, or where the dangerous use to which the product might
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the court implied that a lower standard-embodying negligence
concepts-could be used to determine whether the duty to warn
arises. 74 Only after this test is passed would the stringent standards of strict liability come into play. 5
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although Pennsylvania case law has historically been against the
commingling of strict liability and negligence concepts, a recent
trend of caselaw suggests that change may be imminent in strict
products liability cases involving the failure to warn.76 The most
noteworthy of these changes is the recent decision in Chicago
Bridge, where the Pennsylvania Superior Court expressly indicated
not only that the liability arising from inadequate warnings is not
strict in the same sense as liability arising from manufacturing or
design defects," but also that a proper determination of whether a
product without adequate warnings is defective necessarily involves negligence principles such as reasonableness and foreseeability.78 Based on the court's analysis in Chicago Bridge, it appears that the Pennsylvania courts are now prepared to join the
growing consensus of jurisdictions which have carved an exception
in traditional strict liability analysis by determining that where the
alleged defect is the failure to give adequate warning, the introduction of negligence concepts is not precluded.
PatriciaKurp Masten

be put was reasonably foreseeable. Id.
74. Id. In applying the suggested rule of reasonableness, the court specified that in
every strict products liability action involving the failure to warn, it is a judicial function to
review the facts of each particular case and make an initial determination of whether § 402A
is applicable. Id. at 914.
75. Id. at 913.
76. See Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa. Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408 (1984), appeal dismissed, 508 Pa. 643, 500 A.2d 428 (1985); Staymates v. ITT Holub Indust., 364 Pa. Super.
37, 527 A.2d 140 (1987); Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 545 A.2d 906 (1988).
77. Chicago Bridge, 545 A.2d at 912.
78. Id. at 911-12.

